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Employee Forums in the UK:  
Friend or Foe of Trade Unions? 
Michael Whittall, Alan Tuckman 
With a tradition of informing and consulting employees resting on a single 
union channel, the 2002 EU Information and Consultation (ICE) Directive 
was bound to have a significant impact on employee relations in the UK 
Undoubtedly, the works council as an institution, or employee forum as it 
is often referred to in the UK, represents a totally new departure in UK 
employment relations. The article specifically focuses on the repercus-
sions employee forums might have for trade unions. We focus on two 
companies which have both recently founded employee forums to comply 
with ICE regulation. We ask whether such forums should be considered as 
posing a threat to British trade unions, or platform for revitalising their 
position within the workplace. 
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employee representation 
1. Introduction 
Until recently employee representation in Britain was seen almost exclusively 
in terms of trade union channels of collective bargaining. As in other Euro-
pean countries, the traditional British industrial relations landscape has 
undergone drastic change in recent times – so much so that the word “tradi-
tion” often appears redundant, a term that describes a golden age of collective 
employee representation long past. In making such a claim we are by no 
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means suggesting the existence of an employment representative abyss. On 
the contrary, parallel to these developments the last decade or so has seen an 
increased awareness of other forms of workplace representation. While trade 
union membership has declined in Britain since the 1980s, currently around 
28% (Carley et al. 2007,), alternative forms of employee relations have come 
to the fore, such as the employee forum, a quasi-continental works council.  
Employee forums are the product of the European Union Information and 
Consultation (ICE) Directive (2002). Coming into force in the UK on 6 April 
2005, ICE represents a major departure in British industrial relations. As Hall 
(2005: 104) notes, employees in the UK have for the first time ‘the right to 
insist on being informed and consulted by their employers on a range of key 
business, employment and recruiting issues’. Moreover, employee forums in-
part represent the bifurcation of British industrial relations. As in other 
countries where such systems prevail, most notably in Germany (Whittall 
2005), questions arise concerning the relationship between works councils 
structures and trade unions. In the context of British industrial relations 
where the workplace has always been the epicentre of trade union organisa-
tion, the employee forum may have significant consequences for organised 
labour (Watling/Snook 2003).  
Acknowledging that there exists a natural tension between plant and trade 
union level representation, referred to in the context of German works coun-
cils as Doppelloyalität (double loyalty) (Whittall 2005), the article considers 
the future of trade unionism in two companies which have recently founded 
employee forums. At the heart of the article is the question whether employee 
forums represent, at least potentially, platforms for re-establishing trade 
union collective representation within the workplace. The crux of the ques-
tion involves discerning whether this new organisation, one often created by 
management, represents an environment in which trade union representation 
might flourish, or one where employment terms and conditions remain 
individualised, and relations to management, at least on the surface, marked 
by apparent harmony. The latter scenario clearly implies trade union exclu-
sion, the creation of a trade union “free-zone” 
Locating the role of employee forums in today’s British industrial rela-
tions system, specifically whether they represent a threat to an already de-
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pleted trade union movement; requires a better understanding of how they 
function, in particular the nature of the relationship between management and 
employee forum delegates. To this end we draw heavily on Hyman’s (1997) 
representative framework, a model designed to offer a conceptual understand-
ing of the changing face of employee representation in the UK. Central to 
Hyman’s framework are the notions of autonomy, legitimacy, and efficacy, 
each variable a tool for discerning whether these new employee forums 
represent a collective voice independent of management’s agenda.  
After offering a short insight into the respondents interviewed, the article 
provides a brief description of British industrial relations, focussing specifi-
cally on the role and current state of trade unions in the UK. The article then 
outlines the main features of Hyman’s employee representation framework. 
This is followed by an analysis of two case studies, Isar AG and Interbank, 
both from the finance sector. Finally, the conclusion considers the relation-
ship between trade unions and employee forums. Here we argue that, despite 
these bodies often being established by management in an attempt to practice 
trade union avoidance, such an exercise appears to open the ‘Pandora’s box’ 
out of which employee collective representation may emerge that has conse-
quences contrary to management’s initial intentions.       
2. Methods  
Based on two separate pieces of research, each assessing developments of 
non-standard forms of employee representation in the finance sector, the 
researchers applied a number of research methods. In the case of Interbank, a 
longitudinal analysis, a mixture of individual (with chair) and group (with 
chair and other Forum delegates) interviews took place on and off-site. These 
lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. In addition to interviews with 3 
members of the HR department and an regional trade union officer, the 
researcher also had access to an array of documentation.  
As for Isar AG the responsible researcher conducted interviews on site 
with all existing Forum delegates, five in total over a three day period. Using 
semi-standard and unstructured interview practices, the interviewer spent 
between 2 and three ours with each respondent at Isar AG’s two London 
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sites. Furthermore, the respondents provided documents pertaining to the 
Forum, including a copy of the agreement and copies of the Forum’s newslet-
ter. Interviews were also conducted with the HR and assistant HR manager. 
Correspondence with these two actors also occurred over a one year period.       
3. Changing face of UK Employment Relations 
The UK employment relations system has been framed by a historical pattern 
in which the relative fortunes of actors, more so than in continental Europe, 
have been closely linked to the economic cycle. Specifically this involves the 
fact that British employee relations have been marked by management’s 
willingness to share power, a willingness that comes to the surface in eco-
nomically prosperous times but soon disappears when the economy heads 
into recession. As a consequence the British system has long been character-
ised by a shifting ‘frontier of control’ in which legislative measures, irrespec-
tive of changing historical contexts, have not sustained the influence of 
labour and capital (Hyman 1995). As a consequence of this absence of direct 
state involvement (statutory framework in British employment relations), 
what Flanders (1974) referred to as voluntarism, led to the emergence of a 
single channel of employee representation in the form of trade unionism. 
Until recently this “single channel” remained the main feature of employee 
relations in the UK.  
However, a combination of globalisation (decline in British industry), and 
the arrival of a government committed to challenging the principles of British 
voluntarism under Margaret Thatcher, have undermined the power and 
influence of trade unions. Although the Blair Government’s 1999 Employ-
ment Act attempted to reverse the process of decline in collective bargaining 
and trade union membership by introducing a statutory recognition proce-
dure, the Act’s impact has been modest to date (Gall 2007). Today, trade 
union membership, which peaked at about half the working population 
around 1980, is now down to less than 29 per cent of employees. Although 
this represents a relatively small decline in membership in the public sector, it 
masks a collapse in the private sector where membership density is now 
down to 16.6 per cent (Grainger/Crowther 2007: 1-4). In the finance sector 
 Employee Forums in the UK: Friend or Foe of Trade Unions? 229
union membership has been very high in the high street clearing banks and 
parts of insurance, although this has tended to be exceptional for the finance 
sector where unions’ presence and collective bargaining remained a rarity in 
commercial and investment banking (Storey et al. 1997; Cressey/Scott 1992; 
Gall 1993). De-regulation of the finance and banking sector under the 
Thatcher Government in the 1980s not only allowed the disintegration of 
traditional boundaries between different sorts of financial institution and 
mergers of different companies (which saw the integration of unionised and 
un-unionised companies across the finance spectrum), but also the revision of 
working practices resultant from the relocation of a large proportion of the 
sector’s workforce into hard to unionised call centres (Gall 2005). 
Undoubtedly, these developments contrast greatly with the past. The se-
ries of Workplace Employment (initially Industrial) Relations Surveys 
(WERS) since the 1980s (Millward et al. 2000; Kelsey et al. 2006; also 
Blanchflower et al. 2006) indicate the long term decline of collective bargain-
ing. More specific national bargaining effectively disappeared in the 1980s, 
and while some shift to company wide agreements occurred, the fact remains 
that a mere fifth of employees in the private sector are currently covered by 
collective agreements (Grainger/Crowther 2007).  
The rolling back of British industrial relations, and specifically the decline 
of trade unionism, led some writers to talk about the emergence of “represen-
tation gap” (Towers 1997). Without a doubt there is some truth in such an 
assertion. Nevertheless it would be wrong to over-stress this point. Certainly, 
in the 1980s and 1990s a growth in interest in new consultation arrangements 
could be observed. On the one hand this would appear as a consequence of 
recession (Marchington/Armstrong 1986), management eager to take advan-
tage of trade unions’ woes. On the other hand, however, the changing land-
scape of British employment relations owes a lot to the emergence of the 
European Commission’s commitment under Delors to expand Europe’s role 
in the area of employee relations. Clearly, the passing of the ICE Directive, a 
piece of legislation that introduced a quasi-form of continental works coun-
cils into the British context (Hall 2005), may have wide ranging repercus-
sions for the British system. 
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Although there is no hard quantitative evidence to indicate the impact of 
ICE, the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform sug-
gests that many companies are beginning to show interest in the Directive. 
And while such interest from companies may be an indication of manage-
ments’ willingness to comply with the Directive, it also represents an inde-
pendent initiative to limit the voice of such employee bodies. 
New alternative forms of employee representation, certainly those estab-
lished with the arrival of ICE, represent ‘major implications for the patterns 
of employee representation and trade union organising strategies [and] could 
lead to the biggest change in workplace relations for a generation’ (Hall 
2005: 103). For this reason, Trade Union Confederation though welcoming 
the ICE Directive’s transposition into British law in 2005, is more than 
conscious that employee forums arising from ICE contain certain dangers for 
British unions (Hall 2006), such bodies potentially used by management as a 
barrier to independent employee representation. It remains to be seen then 
whether alternative avenues of employee representation, specifically em-
ployee forums which have emerged since the arrival of ICE, either create an 
environment in which British trade unions can once again flourish, or rather 
act as a barrier to trade unionism.  
4.  Framework for the analysis of employee representation 
In 1997 Blair’s ‘New’ Labour Government replaced the Conservatives with 
the promise of opting into EU employment regulation and the possibility of 
reversing the fortunes of trade unions in Britain. In this context Hyman 
(1997) published a predictive future of employee representation in what he 
termed Britain-in-Europe. The analysis rests heavily on the UK tradition of a 
single channel of representation but recognises the likelihood of some move 
towards a ‘Europeanization’ with the emergence of a dual system incorporat-
ing some form of direct representation, similar to a works council. At the 
time there was some talk of the establishment of works councils in the UK, 
something which might complement or support the revitalisation of trade 
unions, or might act as a barrier to their revival. In the paper Hyman (1997) 
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conceptualises ‘interest representation’ in terms of autonomy, legitimacy and 
efficacy of the employee representatives and representative system.  
Autonomy, independence from the employer, has proved the main con-
cern with the new representative forums which have been established in 
Britain (Butler 2005; Terry 1999; Gollan 2007) and, as we shall see, has also 
been important in shaping the development of our case study forums. A 
central issue with such bodies involves the extent forums are the articulation 
of a coherent employee voice independent of management – who invariably 
bankroll such bodies – or a voice for management in conformance with 
regulation and an attempt to incorporate employees and dissipate any minor 
conflict. A common comment, echoed early in one of our cases, is that they 
spend all their time discussing trivia – car parking and sausages in the can-
teen – rather than the major strategic direction of the company which EU 
policy suggests.  
The legitimacy of representation, the ‘precondition of the representivity of 
representatives’ is ‘gained and sustained by a record of delivering the goods’ 
(Hyman 1997: 310). Thus the employee representatives may gain legitimacy 
by the process of election, but must sustain it amongst their electorate – the 
employees who they represent – through their activities and achievement in 
office. In this sense the legitimacy of representatives is also based on their 
efficacy, their effectiveness in office.  
Efficacy, a “’self evident’ concept but also complex and multifaceted” 
(Hyman 1997: 311), Hyman conceptualised in terms of the ability to acquire 
relevant information (intelligence), formulate policies coherently and dy-
namically (strategically), and to implement them appropriately. However it 
assumes a position independent of, and in opposition to, that of management, 
so that there is linkage here perhaps to a process of interest mobilisation 
(Kelly 1998). In this context where there may be an assumption of common 
interest which may be a mobilisation in favour of management interest. It 
may be that: 
All three elements of interest representation are commonly viewed as sub-
ject to recent challenges which are likely to persist and perhaps intensify 
in the future. Changed management policies (strategies?) threaten the 
autonomy of representative institutions from the employer. More diversi-
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fied patterns of employee interests intensify the problems of filtering and 
aggregating constituents’ expectations. This in turn contributes to a le-
gitimation gap, as does the difficulty of satisfying these expectations in a 
harsher environment. Delivering results in hard times appears to require 
enhanced organizational capacity when representative institutions (trade 
unions, certainly) are in general forced to juggle with depleted resources. 
Devising new pathways to effective intelligence, strategy and competence 
may be crucial in their future. (Hyman 1997: 311) 
Thus to examine the efficacy of employee representation we are required to 
look at not just the autonomy of these representatives, i.e. that they are an 
authentic and independent representative voice, but also their ability to 
mobilise and to act independently. That is, that they are not purely a filter for 
information passed between employees and managers, but also able to ex-
plore, analyse, and judge this information and act on it. However, in examin-
ing the efficacy of such a relationship we need to explore – as Hyman sug-
gests – the levels at which such consultation occurs, the structure of the 
relationship as well as of the employee representative system, the process of 
representation – to what extent is it an informed and meaningful interchange 
– and who sets the agenda of the exchange and how. It is this framework that 
we deploy in the examination of our case studies. 
5. Case Studies 
5.1 Isar AG 
Isar AG is a subsidiary of a major German multinational involved in financial 
services. Based at two sites in London, one in the financial district and the 
other in Canary Wharf, the UK subsidiary has gone through major changes in 
recent years following expansion in the 1990s and recession after the stock 
market crash in 2001. Initially, Isar AG consisted of a small office of around 
20 employees. Today it has a combined workforce of well over 500 workers. 
Expansion reflects the company’s policy of developing its global portfolio 
able to adapt to new high risk market conditions. A central aspect of Isar 
AG’s commitment to change involves developing a new working environ-
ment, one which is ‘a little bit more dynamic, a business focussed organisa-
tion’ according to the UK HR manager. Such dynamism is designed to 
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replace the bureaucratic, ‘civil servant’, mentality that had prevailed in the 
company.  
To facilitate such change, an employment strategy consisting of four fac-
tors has been implemented. The first concerns an employment drive focussed 
on hiring young ambitious graduates. Next, parts of the UK subsidiary were 
moved to a state of the art office complex. This modern open-plan working 
environment is not only designed to create synergies between the different 
business units, but also communicate that a new regime is in place. The third 
involves a higher degree centralisation, the German headquarters increasingly 
overseeing the day-to-day running of the UK subsidiary. Finally, another key 
change involved the setting up of a staff forum. 
Initiated by the UK personnel department in 2006, the UK HR manager 
had to fend off stiff opposition from both central and local management over 
the establishment of the forum. However, HR was able to make a strong 
argument for such a body: 
There were two drivers behind the thinking of the Staff Group; one was 
legislation (information and consultation directive)... it was felt that a pre-
emptive approach would be better. By not waiting until employees called 
for such a Forum, management would be in a position to determine how 
such a body should work – ultimately its remit. Secondly it was felt that 
such a forum would be a good means of getting employees’ “feedback”.  
The last point, ‘employees’ feedback’, was of specific importance for the HR 
department. Conscious that the UK subsidiary had gone through – and was 
still going through – a major period of change, HR felt the staff forum would 
be a good instrument to manage such change. As is implicit in such a stance, 
this newly founded body was brought into life first and foremost to assist 
management rather than offer employees the chance to have their views 
heard. And as will be demonstrated below, this fact had far reaching conse-
quences for the autonomy, legitimacy and efficacy of the Isar AG staff forum  
Though the forum for the very first time provided employees with the 
chance to raise issues, the issues that employees were allowed to address at 
the staff forum were strictly controlled by management. The constitution, 
drawn up together with an external law firm, excluded consideration of 
anything relating to terms and conditions of employment: 
234 Michael Whittall, Alan Tuckman 
[T]he key parameters were set by me and the MD before discussions took 
place within the Forum. It was agreed that the Forum would not discuss 
individual pay or pay related issues, benefits, salary reviews, pensions, re-
dundancies that affect less than 20% of staff, individual staff grievances 
and individual staff disciplinary matters. (HR manager) 
The constitution’s restrictive nature was not welcomed by employee dele-
gates to the staff forum. The inability to discuss salary related issues resulted 
in delegates christening the forum a “paper tiger”. 
5.2 Interbank  
Internet bank was established by a traditional insurance company as part of 
diversification following the deregulation of the financial markets and at the 
time of the e-boom of the late 1990s. Separated formally from its parent, like 
Isar AG it is far removed from the ‘traditional’ image and practices of the 
finance sector. While the main operation of the new company is housed in a 
grey hangar of a new development built on the site of an old industrial plant, 
more than one hundred miles north of the national financial centre, the head 
office remains in London.  
The early years of Interbank were very turbulent, the result of the start-up 
itself, an attempt at stock exchange floatation, and the bursting of the e-boom 
bubble. The decade since its establishment has been one of instability with 
continual insecurity over ownership.  
Overall the company employs about two thousand two hundred employ-
ees with about fifteen hundred of them at the contact centre. Employees tend 
to be relatively young with an average age in the mid-20s. Most have taken 
employment at Interbank as their first job after graduation from higher educa-
tion, with some working part-time while studying. Employee discontent was 
principally expressed through attrition, people leaving employment at Inter-
bank. The labour turnover rate was usually around 20 per cent but sometimes 
as high 40 per cent. Occasionally a situation occurred whereby employees 
could be mobilised over conditions. Further, a trade union, recognised at 
other sites owned by the parent company attempted to gain recognition at 
Interbank, using the poor break times at the contact centre as an issue to 
organise around.  
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Although the initial impetus for establishing the Interbank Peoples Forum 
(IPF) came from the CEO and management as a means of avoid union recog-
nition and comply with I&C regulation, the Forum has become something 
more substantive. Originally confined to bi-monthly cosy chats with the 
CEO, officers have increasingly seen their role as one of building relation-
ships across the organisational hierarchy as well as beyond it into a support-
ing network of external organisations.  
6. Autonomy 
6.1 Isar AG 
In terms of autonomy, huge question marks hang over Isar AG’s staff forum. 
As indicated above, the setting up of the forum was first and foremost a 
management led exercise, a pre-emptive move to control what the forum 
could discuss, who sat on the forum, and what information could be reported 
back to the workforce. For example, though management supported an 
election process in choosing delegates to sit on the forum, three of the even-
tual six delegates indicated that either their line manager or CEO had ap-
proached them to put their name forward for election. These individuals 
became Forum officers by default because of the absence of other candidates. 
Nevertheless, as will become apparent below, managements’ attempt to load 
the Forum with likeminded individuals was only partly a success. Of those 
managerial sponsored delegates only one was perceived to have remained an 
important ally, one manager interviewed referring to the individual in ques-
tion ‘as my favourite delegate’.   Another major management concern in-
volved issues prohibited from being placed on the Forum’s agenda. This 
relates to managements’ main fear, namely that the Forum could become a 
platform for collective bargaining. To ensure that employment terms and 
conditions remained within the scope of what line managers agreed with 
individuals the constitution ensured that so-called “salary related” issues were 
not part of the Forum’s remit. As the following Forum delegate suggests, 
employee representatives are far from happy about the restrictive nature of 
the Forum: 
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I personally wanted benefits there, and the company said “anything that is 
salaried related would be out”. Because they can put a price on all the 
benefits they said “that was salary related.” So we do have a constitution 
but every time we seem to raise something we either get “that is to do with 
office services, that is noting to do with this forum or that is salary related, 
that costs money and is out of our scope”.   
Another factor which highlights the Forum’s lack of independence concerns 
the restrictions placed on delegates’ ability to report back to the workforce. 
This concerns specifically the HR department’s blatant censorship of the 
Forum’s newsletter according to a delegate:  
We put together a newsletter which gets heavily edited, watered down. If 
we raise things and we get a “no” from the company that tends to get ed-
ited out of the newsletter. Only the real positive things tend to make the 
newsletter which I think is wrong. I don’t think the newsletter gives a bal-
anced view of what actually happened, and I think that is the general opin-
ion and not just the people on the Forum. We are an intelligent company 
and the people can see through it, they see that it is a load of tosh. 
Recently, though, the newsletter has been produced with very little difficulty, 
management required to make very few changes. However, as the following 
employee respondent ironically indicates, this has more to do with employee 
representatives becoming acquainted with management’s censorship guide-
lines than management being more lenient towards the newsletter’s content: 
I now think we know who our audience is, and the audience is not just the 
staff. We have to consider HR as well… (HR) do put a bit of slant on it, 
which does not always reflect the true outcome. 
Management’s apprehension towards the European ICE Directive saw it 
reluctantly establish the Employee Forum, a forum which would only be 
tolerated if management had the decisive say in how it functioned. However, 
as the proceeding sections demonstrate, pre-emptive approaches are no 
guarantee of employee delegates’ willingness to comply with the guidelines 
set down management.
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6.2 Interbank 
Initially as a means of excluding the trade union, which is recognised else-
where within the parent company, a member of the HR Department was 
given the task of establishing an employee forum. This they based on the 
EWC constitution established by the parent company. At first this allowed for 
elected officers from different levels and departments within Interbank to 
meet about six times a year with the CEO for what were described as ‘fire-
side chats’. Some elected representatives in the Interbank People Forum (IPF) 
became discontent with the limited role the body was playing; concerned as 
they said with ‘sausages in the canteen and car parking’ they pushed for a 
more significant voice in shaping the strategy and policy of the bank. This 
seemed to come in the role the IPF played, if ambiguous, in the attempt at 
union recognition. Two influential IPF officers, members of a trade union, 
while initially seeming sympathetic to the trade union advances still blocked 
recognition and pushed for an expanded role for the Forum. These two 
officers were given secondment to explore how they could develop the role 
of the forum. They successfully pushed for the election of three full time 
officers and an autonomous budget for an elected forum of twelve representa-
tives drawn from the main and the two smaller sites of Interbank and sections 
of the workforce including management. At least formally the forum is 
jointly chaired by the CEO and an employee chair, one of the full time offi-
cers. As the employee chair explained: 
I’ve been called the (IPF) manager but I’m not, I’m the employee chair of 
the IPF. The Forum is still jointly chaired by myself and … the chief exec 
but, in reality, as he says “You do it all” and that’s something that’s 
evolved since 2002 and the advent of the full-time reps. He knows now 
that I do it full time and I get on with it. He trusts me to get on with it and 
when I meet with him on a regular basis he just says ‘how’s it going?” 
The two seconded employee representatives set about reforming the IPF. This 
included replacing the constitution with a ‘commitments document’, consid-
ered less like the bureaucratic formulation of both traditional financial institu-
tions and that of the trade unions giving the IPF the mission to “represent the 
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voice of all (Interbank) People to make working life great and help drive 
superior business results”. Its objectives: 
– To increase the level of employee involvement in changes and business 
initiatives which affect employees using effective consultation. 
– To build and maintain effective relationships within all departments of 
(Interbank) through consultation. 
– To represent independently and without prejudice the interests of (Inter-
bank) People both collectively and individually. 
The overall intention, at least explicitly, was to make it less like a trade union 
body, i.e. avoiding formal agreements. Also the full time IPF officers report 
to the HR Department but, they claim, this is no more than a formality. Like 
at Isar AG this may be because officers have learnt, or in this case may share, 
the same parameters of acceptability as corporate managers. In this they 
espoused an essential harmonious view of relations in the workplace so that, 
while they rejected the trade union approaches, they found an appeal in 
aspects of ‘partnership’.  
Very sensitive to the accusation that they did not have autonomy from 
management, the IPF set out to establish its own identity. Importantly, also, 
the changes in the IPF meant an effective expansion in its role, characterised 
as moving to ‘playing it big’. Additional to the established quarterly informa-
tion and consultation meetings with the CEO the IPF moved to ‘involvement 
at all levels’ establishing relations with as wide a range of managers within 
the company as possible. The idea of this was to allow a level of intelligence 
on any issues that may be arising and consultation at as early a stage as 
possible. The forum officers also began establishing relationships with out-
side bodies. Through these contacts, and particularly through the Involvement 
and Participation Association, it gained training and expertise. What might be 
expected of a trade union, by a more traditional employee representative 
body, is funded from their own budget. However, the budget is solely de-
pendent on company management – the patronage of the CEO. Thus IPF may 
have a degree of autonomy from Interbank management in their control over 
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their activities, including their budget spending, but they do not have inde-
pendence from it being dependent on them for the budget itself.  
7. Legitimacy 
7.1 Isar AG 
Quite clearly the lack of autonomy employee representatives enjoy can be a 
threat to their legitimacy. Certainly, delegates to the Isar AG forum were 
more than conscious of this potential problem. In particular they were aware 
that the issues the workforce was interested in, terms and conditions, were 
formally excluded from the Forum’s agenda. Delegates, however, felt a 
strong sense of responsibility to the people they represented. There was a 
strong commitment not just to appear a ‘voice box to collate information 
about queries, questions and concerns’. Such concerns had the effect that 
Employee Forum delegates were very committed to demonstrating to the 
workforce that they were not the extended arm of the HRM department.  
Although management had gone to great lengths to control the agenda, 
this did not deter employee representatives from raising salary related issues 
at Forum meetings. When interviewed employee respondents demonstrated, a 
strong commitment to representing the workforce, this at times to the annoy-
ance of management. Delegates were quite subtle and strategic in the way 
they raised issues. A procedure was followed which involved delegates 
posing questions irrespective of the agenda’s restrictive guidelines. They felt 
management might wish to know about issues that the workforce had raised. 
In this sense the delegation was able to place itself in a positive light, a 
conduit through which the workforce could enter into consultation with 
management.  
One issue that has been raised on many occasions concerns maternity 
leave:  
Therefore, we put it (maternity leave) forward at the staff forum and we 
said “Yes we are aware that we cannot raise it but we think you should be 
aware that it is being raised.” Therefore, it is down to them (management) 
what they do with it, it is not something that we sit and discuss and say 
“This is what people are asking for.” From my point of view if something 
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is raised, if people have come to us and asked us to put something forward 
we should do that. Whether we are allowed to actually sit down and talk 
about it is another matter, but at least we have raised it and then we can go 
back to that person and say “look we have raised it in the staff forum, it is 
actually something we are not allowed to discuss ourselves but HR are 
now aware of it.” 
Raising unconstitutional issues and ensuring that issues discussed at meetings 
are correctly documented, is clearly a means of demonstrating to the work-
force, and equally to the HR department, that the delegates are not “manage-
ment lackeys”:  
There are points we have raised and we say “look can we just minute it, 
that we did actually raise it? If you are not going to do anything about it 
that is down to you but make sure that it is in the minutes. That we 
brought it up.” So we are doing our part of the deal if you like. 
Faced by a management team not always co-operative, Forum delegates, who 
after all were conscious that they cannot hide away in the confines of a 
Forum’s office like their German counterparts, have to return to the shop 
floor and work alongside their colleagues. For this reason, Forum delegates 
are constantly required to demonstrate their legitimate right to represent the 
workforce. As will be indicated below, delegates’ insistence that they are not 
“management lackeys” helps steer management into a cul-de-sac, one involv-
ing a legitimacy crisis for management should the workforce question the 
value of the Forum.  
7.2 Interbank 
One of the reasons that the IPF initiated its transformation was because of 
accusations, coming from many of the workforce (as well as the trade un-
ions), that it was ‘management’s poodle’. It was also concerned that the 
consultations it was engaged in, like other non-union consultative bodies 
(Gollan 2007), mainly concerned ‘sausages in the canteen’ and car parking. 
Increasingly they presented an independent identity, which involved their 
own logo sported on sweatshirts and a banner.  More substantively, however, 
this identity involved consultation on far more substantive issues, as well as 
being party to involvement with managers at all levels of the company. The 
 Employee Forums in the UK: Friend or Foe of Trade Unions? 241
promotion of this independent identity involved the production of a promo-
tional video, with the IPF presenting itself as both useful to management but 
also as, in the words of one employee who is featured in the video, ‘like 
having our own little union’. Given that the IPF, unlike a trade union, is not 
dependent on recruitment of employees, this exercise must be seen as part of 
an attempt to establish an independent status and legitimacy amongst their 
constituents of both managers and employees.  
While bargaining over anything is prohibited – this is anyway alien to an 
Interbank culture where people engage in frequent ‘conversations rather than 
anything considered conflictual or confrontational’ – there are consultations 
on all issues which may involve Interbank employees. So IPF do not bargain 
over pay and conditions, which are determined through grade benchmarking 
against other employers. However Forum officers do represent employees in 
grievances and take up individual cases which involve pay levels of individ-
ual employees’. As important is the fact that they are party to consultation 
concerning changes in the process of pay determination. To gain visibility, 
IPF officers hold monthly ‘awareness days’ on each of the sites, and are 
available to hear any grievances or to discuss problems with any employees 
who may approach them. These are also used as an informal hustings for 
candidates at IPF elections. 
The IPF have become involved in all the areas where consultation may be 
expected in a traditional workplace and are the direct concern within ICE 
regulations. The corporate turbulence has meant continual change, and so IPF 
officers have also been involved in consultation over redundancies and 
transfers of employment resulting from buy-outs.  
8. Efficacy 
8.1 Isar AG 
Finally, the efficacy of Isar AG delegates was severely hampered by prob-
lems associated with autonomy and legitimacy discussed above, and hence 
necessitated a high degree of skill in formulating and promoting policies 
supported by the workforce but opposed by management. As Hyman (1997: 
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311) notes, the question of efficacy needs ‘to be viewed as relative to what is 
potentially attainable’. Undoubtedly, there were numerous factors which 
hampered the efficacy of staff forum delegates. First and foremost there was 
the issue of time, delegates complaining that they were often required to 
undertake staff forum duties, i.e. preparing for meetings, liaising with the 
workforce and other delegates, in their own time (usually dinner-break). 
According to the chair of the staff forum, the HR manager, ‘Delegates are 
given what the company refers to as a reasonable amount of time to fulfil 
their Forum duties’. However, by not clearly defining what amounts to 
“reasonable” time allows line managers’ to abuse their position of power by 
not respecting delegates’ rights to undertake Forum duties. One respondent 
noted:  
I imagine the time in the constitution is okay. It is whether we actually get 
it, whether our managers, whether our workload reflects this time, that we 
actually get this time. 
When faced by such opposition, though, respondents were not reluctant to 
point out that management had favoured the establishment of the Forum. 
Generally delegates complained that they were not allocated enough time for 
Forum business. The time issue alone, however, was not the only variable 
which had a potentially negative bearing on the efficacy of employee dele-
gates. The other factor concerned skill sets. As has proven to be the case in 
Germany for many decades, the ability of German works councils to formu-
late and implement policies depends very much on delegates being trained to 
undertake representative duties. All respondents indicated that, excluding the 
one day they spent with a lawyer to draw-up the constitution, they had re-
ceived no training to support them in tasks on the Forum. 
Delegates have been quite adroit, however, in addressing the skills deficit. 
Undoubtedly, their cause has been furthered by their own biographies. With 
the exception of one delegate all were former graduates with considerable 
experience in the industry. Hence, as a group they could draw on a consider-
able pool of knowledge. In addition they possessed a network of contacts in 
financial services which could be accessed. Combined these two factors 
helped the employee Forum delegates to often outflank management as well 
as offer the ability to draw-up well thought through policy changes. An 
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example of such a situation involved recent changes to the salary review, 
changes that management implemented without consulting the workforce. 
But, as the following respondent notes, such a move not only undermines the 
value of the Forum, but it also fails to consider that delegates can see through 
such underhand management manoeuvres in relation to contracts:  
Again this is what we do. This is our job to load things monthly. It is how 
premiums work … They did all this (salary review) without any consulta-
tion and they should have loaded it with around 4% to take into account 
changes in interest rates. This is what we do and they sometimes think 
they can get away with these things and they don’t realise that we are ac-
tually quite intelligent people.    
Finally, contacts that delegates have at other companies can prove an excel-
lent source of information. It represents a key factor that contributes to their 
efficacy. This quite clearly proved to be case when management agreed to 
undertake a benchmarking exercise in connection to maternity leave. Al-
though management argued, that its existing maternity leave policy (one that 
falls in line with statutory maternity leave) was in line with what it referred to 
as the “market value”, namely what employees at other companies’ were 
entitled to, delegates refused to accept such a stance. Staff forum delegates 
undertook their own benchmarking exercise which suggested Isar AG’s 
policy was anything but in-line with what employees at other companies were 
entitled to: 
They (management) respond by saying they have listened to us and that 
they have reviewed it (maternity leave) in the past and that they are in line 
with the market – end of story. This is often challenged – the Forum 
members want to see the benchmarking the company has done – but the 
company refuses to share this information. Like I said we work in em-
ployee benefits and we know lots of other people in other companies and 
people will do their own benchmarking. There was even an article in the 
Guardian which graded companies and the general benefits were there and 
if you placed us into those benefits we would have been right at the bot-
tom. So we said “you say we are line with the market but everything we 
see says that we are not, prove it to us.”  
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8.2 Interbank 
One immediate contrast between Isar AG and Interbank forums appears the 
issue of time for officers. IPF has three full time officers whose time is fully 
funded by the company. The remaining eight or nine employee forum mem-
bers receive time to perform their duties. This, though, has to be agreed with 
their line manager and can vary dependent on demands. Interestingly, such an 
arrangement does not appear to be problematic. This was the result of the 
changes that occurred, of ‘playing it big’, initiated two years after the forum 
was founded. To a large extent this put the forum into the hands of the em-
ployees, the role of management becoming more notional, giving them both 
time and control over a budget. Importantly the independent budget has 
allowed the reps to undergo a range of training. As the employee chair ex-
plained: 
One of the beauties about … having your own budget is the fact that I can 
decide, we can decide when, how and who actually does the – does the 
training. And – and who it’s for, so it’s not HR thinking we’ll do this 
training for you.  
The existence of three full time officers, the employee chair and ‘A’ and ‘V’ 
(see below), also means that IPF consultation has expanded dramatically 
beyond the original bimonthly meetings with the CEO. Again, as the em-
ployee chair relates: 
[O]ne of the advantages of us having three full time people about is that 
each one of us has different relationships. … So we’ve got, we’ve got (A) 
and (V) both meeting the head of banking once a month. So we’ve got two 
of our reps meeting the head of banking on a monthly basis. … I’m meet-
ing banking products director once a month. I’ve got meetings with – I’ll 
meet the chief exec personally once a month. We’ve got (A) meeting the 
chief information officer, head of technology, once a month. You’ve got 
all sorts. There – so those sorts of things at the top are going on. Then 
we’ve got well, people leaders. We’ve got meetings with them fortnightly. 
I’ll meet with the head of borrowing every fortnight. So we’ve got – it’s 
just so regular. It’s so regular with no – no particular agenda, just what’s 
going on, what you’d like to tell me, what – what you want from me, how 
can I help you?  
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The changes have not just meant an expansion in I&C activity but also into 
what may be considered more traditional, even trade union, areas. IPF mem-
bers act as health and safety reps, and at least the full time officers take on a 
caseload in individual discipline and grievances. However, what might 
characterise their approach, as intimated above, is that essentially they see 
their role not as an advocate of, individual or collective employee interests, 
but of creating harmony and consent within the employment relationship.  
The reason for the success of the IPF may be that it has not challenged 
management interests or their agenda but reinforced and supported it. In one 
sense, then, if we apply Hyman’s (1997) notion of representation, the full 
time officers of the IPF are not representative. IPF officers have been a 
relatively stable part of the Interbank environment with long service in the 
finance sector or even transferred in by the parent company at the founding. 
Their biographies, therefore, were not the typical Interbank employee in their 
twenties just starting out in their career and prone to exit, rather than exercis-
ing their employee voice. All three full time officers have long experience 
within the finance sector, mostly with the parent company, which can be 
drawn on and which gives them authority. The employee chair also had 
around seventeen years experience as an employee representative with a trade 
union which gave him further resources to draw on. However this very 
experience seemed to have made him critical of the bureaucratic procedures 
of ‘the brothers’; that trade unions had become distanced and impersonal. 
Due to the unstable ownership of Interbank the IPF established bonds with 
unions representing workers at other sites and another employee forum in the 
company developing a strategy to deal with potential redundancies. The 
forum officers, while distancing themselves formally from trade unions, have 
participated in external organisations where trade unions have been present 
and therefore gained useful advice and support for their own activities. In 
addition, the beginnings of an informal network of employee forums could be 
observed. This network represented a source of “best practice” in which 
forums could gain valuable experience of individual and collective represen-
tation in such eventualities as redundancy and transfer.  
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9. Comparison of factors 
The emergence of new employee representative structures at Isar AG and 
Interbank are symbolic of quite wide-raging changes sweeping through 
British industrial relations in recent years. The establishment of such em-
ployee bodies is, as other researchers have also noted (see Terry 1999; Gollan 
2007), often a management driven initiative. In both of our two case studies 
presented in this article management’s commitment to these new forums 
comes from an interest in customising any eventual representative body to 
meet their own particular requirements along with immediate compliance 
with the new regulation. Conscious that national and European law have 
opened up new representative avenues for employees, management at both 
Isar AG and Interbank were committed to a pre-emptive strategy. Hence, they 
could draw-up a constitution which ensured them ultimate control over such a 
body, control which would influence the Forums’ autonomy, legitimacy and 
efficacy.
Table 1 draws from our analysis above compares the two cases. It demon-
strates that while one set of these actors, the managers, sought to write the 
script for the others to follow, employees were reluctant to adhere to their 
lines and improvised their own action. Obviously one has to guard against 
drawing too broad or general conclusions from a mere two case studies 
especially when the forums in question are explicitly non-trade union bodies 
and supported by management as such. This is despite the fact that such 
forums clearly offer employees a collective voice. The two cases are also 
both in the same sector, with its own traditions, which may make any conclu-
sions less generalisable beyond finance and banking. These were also essen-
tially two green field sites with no history or tradition of trade unionism. The 
parent company of Interbank had recognition on some sites but nevertheless 
the forums were established where no other collective voice was present. 
A number of factors appear to have influenced Forum delegates’ com-
mitment to attaining a degree of autonomy. Firstly, delegates were shown to 
be disappointed by management’s lack of respect for their new office. This 
expressed itself in a general opposition on the part of delegates being treated 
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as nothing more than the extended arm of the HR department. Although 
delegates accepted they had an important communication role to play be-
tween management and the workforce, such a role had to include a degree of 
participation in influencing company policy. A defining factor appears 
closely linked then to the fact that respondents in their day-to-day work were 
used to being consulted if not included in decisions – their expertise often 
sought.  
Table 1: A Comparison of Isar AG and Interbank 
Autonomy Legitimacy Efficacy 
Isar AG Management influence over 
election 
Prohibition of ‘salary related’ 
issues
Control over report back 
and the newsletter 
Not management lackey? 
Getting it on the agenda 
‘reasonable’ amount 





Interbank Amicus attempt recognition 
in line with parent company 
agreement 
Initial Forum ‘fireside chats’ 
with CEO about ‘sausages 
and car parking’ replaced by 
‘Playing it big’ and commit-
ments document 
Three full time officers  
‘Involvement at all levels’ 
Attempt to construct 
independent identity 
Awareness days 




3 full time officers plus 
‘reasonable’ time for 
others 
Own training budget 
For this reason they did not necessarily take kindly to the dictate of manage-
ment. As a consequence of managements’ attempt to control the Forums a 
sense of politicisation amongst delegates was to be observed. Although such 
opposition would not appear to be the result of an emerging class conscious-
ness, it nevertheless had the effect of placing divisions between management 
and Forum delegates. In the case of Isar AG, this was emergent around such 
issues as maternity leave, but at Interbank had emerged much earlier and had 
meant the shift to ‘playing it big’ with the key employee actors successfully 
re-shaping their forum to give it greater significance within employment 
relations, both individual and collective, within the company. 
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In both cases Forum delegates were opposed to playing the role of mere 
extras. Delegates were anxious to demonstrate that they possessed their own 
script from which to read, as well as a willingness to draw from their own 
experience and express their own interests. Even where delegates were hand-
picked by management, the individuals in question were committed to dis-
tancing themselves from their initial benefactor. Managements’ customising 
project was clearly not the unmitigated success it was intended to be, far from 
it, autonomy proved to be a contentious issue. 
Another factor that influenced delegates’ desire to distance themselves 
from management involved the question of legitimacy, in particular the 
workforce’s view of delegates’ position within the Forum. At one level this 
concerned the above issue of not appearing to be a “management poodle”. 
This was because delegates noted the workforce had a right to a collective 
voice, a collective voice that could only be realised if the Forum remained 
independent of management’s control. Combined, these factors ensured that 
delegates were committed to moving the goalposts initially set down by 
management. In Interbank the Forum has gone from being a “sausages and 
car park” structure to one which now possess three fulltime officers and is 
consulted by management on a wide-range of issues. The developmental 
process mirrors many of the research findings on EWCs. Researchers demon-
strating that though such bodies often have limited rights to start off with, this 
does not deter employee representatives from attempting to broaden its initial 
management remit (Lecher et al. 2001; Knudsen et al. 2007; Huijgen et al. 
2007; Whittall 2007, 2009; Kotthoff 2006).  
As for the Isar AG Forum, progress could also be observed. Delegates 
were shown to be quite innovative in challenging the restrictive representa-
tive parameters set by management, so much so that occasionally manage-
ment were forced to acquiesce to delegates demands and discuss salary 
related issues formally excluded by the constitution. As at Interbank, dele-
gates were partly able to wrest control of the Forum from management. Of 
course, its next challenge involves formally extending the Forum’s agenda as 
well as improving the time resources that delegates have at their disposal. 
However, even at Interbank, the forum remains dependent on senior man-
agement, and particularly the incumbent CEO, on whose patronage their 
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budget – which pays for training and facilities as well as the salaries of 
officers – is ultimately dependent.            
10. Conclusion 
When Hyman (1997) speculated on the future of employee representation in 
Britain more than a decade ago he was writing at the time when there was 
some belief that the return of a Labour government might reverse the decline 
in trade union membership. Any such optimism would now appear to have 
been misplaced. Certainly, a return to traditional British employment rela-
tions has failed to materialise. The revival of trade unions has not occurred, 
membership has stagnated (Mercer/Notley 2008) and recognition remains 
marginal outside of the public sector (Kelsey et al. 2006).  
In addition, British trade unionism has faced the arrival of the ICE regula-
tions; a development which some commentators believed might lead to a 
revival of workplace organisation and action. On the other hand it has not 
gone unnoticed that employee forums represent just another competitor for 
trade unions in wining the hearts and minds of employees. While there is 
little systematic data currently available on the number and spread of non-
union employee representative bodies established in the UK, it is clear that 
some have been established as a direct competitor to trade unions where trade 
unions are not recognised but also where they already exist and are recog-
nised. This could even be conceived as a managerial strategy to marginalise 
trade unions. The two case studies presented in this article, though, suggest 
the existence of a silver lining: management’s response to ICE (an attempt to 
highjack employee forums) producing a conflict situation in which employee 
delegates might be less resistant to trade union organisation. Of course any 
extrapolation from a mere two cases must be tenuous, and there are some 
peculiarities which may colour any conclusion. It does appear, however, that 
the very development of a collective voice, the result of management’s 
attempt to control the forum, can mobilise employees. Certainly historical 
experiences of trade union revival are that ‘new unionism’ may appear 
outside, and in antagonism to, established unions. For exampled, as demon-
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strated amongst mass production workers in the USA in the 1930s (see e.g. 
Fine 1969).   
The question trade unions have to address involves discerning how they 
can tap into employees’ disenchantment with the way employee forums 
function under a unitarist regime. Certainly, there exists another historical 
precedent in the form of the German situation shortly after the Works Consti-
tution Act (1952) came into effect that British unions might wish to reflect 
on. As in Britain today the work of German works councils was undermined 
by a lack of resources. Interestingly, the solution in Germany involved unions 
providing works councils with external support in the form of expertise and 
training. By making themselves a valuable asset for works councils, German 
unions could go someway in neutralising the tension between plant and 
industrial level representation (Whittall 2005, 2007).  
Theoretically British unions could adhere to a similar strategy. But for this 
to happen British trade unions, irrespective of the question of resources, 
would need to reach out and embrace employee forums, an act which requires 
them to break with the past. Traditionally there has been little enthusiasm in 
the UK for a system of employee representation resembling the works coun-
cil system in Germany. Hence, trade unions will be required, like manage-
ment, to respect the autonomy of employee forums. As one respondent 
indicated trade unions have to acknowledge that employee forums do not 
represent a modern shop-stewards committee, but rather a body which first 
represents the interests of employees within the company and then possibly 
the interests of the union. The real litmus test for British trade unions ulti-
mately involves a willingness to agree to a dualistic system of British em-
ployee relations, along the lines developed in Germany over many decades. 
However there appears evidence that once the pandora’s box of collective 
voice is opened, in whatever form, it is hard to subsequently close it. What 
may be more difficult is whether we are seeing a nascent works council 
system in the UK, following employers responses to the ICE regulations, or 
either a symptom of the revival of established trade unions, or the very 
preliminary founding – perhaps unintentionally – of a new mechanism for 
employee voice and mobilisation. 
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